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COMMENT
not yet widely regarded as criminal."3 However,
the existence of injunctive relief along with the
criminal sanctions, establishes the Refuse Act of
1899 as a formidable anti-pollution enactment.
The Refuse Act Permit Program curtails the ap-
plicability of the Refuse Act and attempts to link
it to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
by limiting the imposition of the Refuse Act pen-
alties to instances where an industry has failed
to comply with FWPCA-approved water quality
standards and has not received a permit. By re-
lying on water quality standards, the Refuse Act
Permit Program imposes criminal liability with-
out regard to the harm done to the receiving water-
way by a particular discharge. This result is con-
trary to the purpose of the Refuse Act as expressed
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Republic
Steel Corp.,"4 and to the national policy of non-
degradation as expressed by the Congress in the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969."'
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act" 6 sets
a different standard of compliance than the one
laid down in the Refuse Act. While under the
Refuse Act, all discharges made without a permit
11 See notes 34 and 35 supra.
1 362 U.S. 428 (1960).
"'42 U.S.C. §§ 4332 et seq. (Supp. V, 1970).
11633 U.S.C. §§ 1151 et seq. (1970).
constitute a criminal offense, the FWPCA states
that only discharges of certain substances above
specified levels are civil offenses, and are not sub-
ject to criminal presecution. The three programs
when considered together constitute a confusing,
contradictory, and seldom effective scheme for
regulating water pollution.
To eliminate the confusion produced by the
existing series of legislative enactments dealing
with water pollution and to insure non-degradation
of the waterways, a comprehensive re-expression
of Congressional intent is necessary--one that
has as its aim the eventual elimination of all dis-
charges. Congress must establish a readily en-
forcible enforcement procedure with meaningful
deterrent levels. This procedure might provide
civil penalties for negligent and minor offenses
with criminal sanctions like those of the Refuse
Act but with more stringent punishments reserved
for cases of willful and extreme violations. Such a
scheme would preserve the stigma of criminality
for blatant violations where culpability is greatest,
and establish more effective criminal deterrents.
The proposed Senate amendment to the FWPCA
117
has many of these attributes.
'
17 See note 105 supra.
RECENT TRENDS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
NONUNANIMOUS VERDICTS
In Johnson v., Louisiana, 92 S.Ct. 1620 (1972),
and Apodaca v. Oregon, 92 S.Ct. 1628 (1972), the
Supreme Court held that 9-3 and 10-2 verdicts,
respectively, are constitutionally sufficient to con-
vict in state criminal trials. In Johnson, tried be-
fore the sixth amendment was applied to the
states,' the defendant claimed that less than
unanimous verdicts circumvented the due process
requirement of proving guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.' Mr. Justice White, writing for a five-
justice majority, rejected the argument that nine
individual jurors could not vote conscientiously in
favor of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt when
three of their colleagues are arguing for acquittal.
' The sixth amendment right to trial by jury was
made applicable to the states in Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). Duncan does not apply retro-
actively. DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 633 (1968).
2 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970), held
that the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment protects an accused against conviction except
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged.
He perceived no basis for concluding that the nine
Jurors voting for conviction disregarded the in-
struction pertaining to standard of proof. The
majority also held that three acquittal votes did
not demonstrate that guilt was not in fact proved
beyond reasonable doubt. The Court emphasized
that a "substantial majority" of the jury was
convinced, and there was no reason to equate lack
of unanimity with the existence of reasonable
doubt.
In Apodaca four justices agreed that the sixth
amendment applied in its entirety to the states,
but concluded that its guarantee of a jury trial
does not require unanimous verdicts. Justice
White, joined by Chief Justice Burger, and Jus-
tices Blackmun and Rehnquist, noted that the
drafters of the Bill of Rights deleted from the
sixth amendment the express requirement of una-
nimity in criminal cases. Furthermore, the plural-
ity felt that the historical purpose of the jury, to
interpose the common sense of laymen between




Mr. Justice Powell, although concurring in the
result, argued that historically the sixth amend-
ment right to jury trial has carried with it the
safeguard of unanimous verdicts in federal trials.
However, he contended that the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment does not incorporate
all the particulars of the sixth amendment right
to a jury trial. Therefore, he concluded, the states
are free, within certain bounds, to experiment
with jury trial variations.
. Justices Douglas, Stewart, Brennan and Mar-
shall dissented in both cases. Justice Douglas,
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, pointed
out that the Court long ago held that the verdict
in civil trials must be unanimous,' and argued that
it is anomalous to allow a person to be stripped of
his liberty by a lesser standard. Justice Stewart,
also joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
argued that a unanimous verdict was necessary
to minimize the potential effects of bigotry. Jus-
tices Brennan and Marshall each filed dissents
in which the other joined. Justice Brennan noted
that unanimous verdicts assured that each juror
would be heard. Justice Marshall felt that the
decision cut the heart out of the right to trial by
jury and the right to proof beyond reasonable
doubt.
TESTIMONIAL IMmuNrrY
In Kastigar v. United States, 92 S.Ct. 1653 (1972))
and Zicarelli v. New Jersey, 92 S.Ct. 1670 (1972),
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the federal statute' and a state statute5 conferring
use and derivative use immunity, but not transac-
tional immunity, on witnesses compelled to testify
against themselves. Mr. Justice Powell, writing for
a 5-2 majority in both cases, stated that the-fifth
amendment privilege is coextensive with immunity
from use of the compelled testimony in subsequent
proceedings and use of evidence derived from the
testimony, but does not require immunity from
prosecution for offenses to which the compelled
testimony relates.
In so holding, the Court disregarded language
in Counselnan v. Hitchcock6 that the constitution
required absolute transactional immunity. Mr.
Justice Powell noted that this language was dicta,
since the statute then under consideration had
3 The seventh amendment right to a trial by jury in
civil cases has been held to require a unanimous verdict.
American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464 (1897).
' 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970).
:N.J. REv. STAT. § 52:9 M-17(a) (Supp. 1970).
142 U.S. 547, 585-86 (1892).
been construed to afford only use immunity and
not derivative use immunity, as did the federal
and New Jersey acts. Furthermore, he argued
that both the reasoning and the result in Murphy
v. Waterfront Commission 7 compelled the conclu-
sion that transactional immunity was not consti-
tutionally mandated.8
The Court emphasized that in a subsequent
prosecution the government must prove that its
evidence is derived from a legitimate source wholly
independent of the compelled testimony.
Justices Douglas and Marshall dissented in
both cases; Justices Brennan and Rehnquist did
not take part in the consideration or decision of
either case.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
In United States v. Doyle, 456 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir.
1972), the court of appeals upheld a warrantless
search of a drug suspect's garage incident to his
warrantless arrest in the house. An informant of
proven reliability had told federal agents that the
defendant had drugs stored in his garage and was
preparing to leave town. With this information
justifying his immediate arrest, the agents entered
the house and found the defendant and a female
companion locked in the bathroom, the toilet
flushing. The court determined that the crime of
illegal possession of drugs had been committed
in the officers' presence, and that the search of
the garage was reasonable in order to prevent
further destruction of evidence.
The per curiam opinion does not mention Chimel
v. California, which held that a warrantless search
incident to an arrest should be limited to the ar-
restee's person and the area within his immediate
control.9 Rather, the Fifth Circuit opinion seem-
ingly adopts Mr. Justice White's dissent in Chimel.
Justice White contended that if there is probable
cause for a search, an extensive search following
an arrest is reasonable, since the arrest is an exi-
gent circumstance justifying police action before
evidence can be removed or destroyed. 10
7378 U.S. 52 (1964).
8 In Murphy, witnesses were granted transactional
immunity under the laws of New York and New Jersey,
but continued to refuse to testify on the ground that
their answers might tend to incriminate them under
federal law. The Court held that the fifth amendment
privilege protects state witnesses against federal as well
as state law, and thus the compelled testimony and its
fruits may not be used by federal officials in a subse-
quent prosecution. 378 U.S. at 79.
9 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
'1Od. at 780 (dissenting opinion of Justice White).
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